

7. I have been provided with;
  - Transcripts of oral evidence given by current and former Metropolitan Police Officers;
  - Witness Statement of Gary Smith (MPS0004532)
  - Witness Statement of Mark Cockerham (MPS0004533)
  - A number of Crimint Intel Records namely MPS0004695 - CPRT00060167 - IPP Record Print requested by P220836 Gary Smith dated 5 May 2015, MPS0004696 - CPRT00060209 - IPP Record Print requested by P220836 Gary Smith dated 24 April 2015 and MPS0004697 - CPRT00060325 - IPP Record Print requested by P220836 Gary Smith dated 5 May 2015.
8. There is however also contrasting evidence which suggests that Serco was not included in briefings due to a rationale which sought to limit those with knowledge of the operation and not because Serco is a corruption risk.
9. As far as I can see, there is no evidence of corruption either associated with any one identifiable individual or any identifiable group of individuals within Serco PECS, nor is there any evidence of Serco collusion with the incident on 11 December 2015. Most importantly, there appears to be no intelligence which gave any cause to question the integrity of the Senior Management of Serco PECS whom would have been the point of contact for the Metropolitan Police had they chosen to include Serco in briefings regarding operation Ankaa.
10. Serco PECS were a panel member of the quarterly meetings arranged by the London Prisons Anti -Corruption Team (LPACT) which was a team of specialist Metropolitan Police Detectives and embedded Prison Service Governors, which was the communications forum for the sharing and exchange of intelligence and for addressing concerns. The PECS Prison Service Management was also represented on that committee, which provided an effective channel for the free flow of information between the Police, the Prison Service and Serco PECS. There was a Memorandum of Understanding between members of LPACT, although I am unable to locate a copy as all LPACT matters were held on a previous laptop system linked to our Police National Network (PNN) email address and this was discontinued in 2018, and these records were deleted. However, any investigation and intelligence generated or recorded by LPACT would be multi-agency but Police led, with all Actions recorded in the Minutes by one of the LPACT Detectives.
11. Serco PECS was represented on LPACT by Damon Rowles between 2013 and 2016, and then by Trevor Brading (Head of Corporate Investigations for Serco UK&Europe) and myself during 2016, and was also sometimes attended by Pete Masters, Head of Standards and Security for PECS at the time. After I became Head of Security & Investigations for PECS in April 2016 and then Investigations &

Complaints Manager for PECS in due course, I became the Serco PECS representative. Serco PECS and other stakeholders on the LPACT Panel were in constant communication and at no point was I aware of any concerns around the sharing of information with Serco. My understanding was that the Police had every confidence in the Serco Representatives, and I would expect them to have taken comfort on the basis that Serco & Serco PECS employ a number of distinguished ex-Police Officers. My two Investigators were also time served retired Police Officers and I understand that Trevor Brading served in West Yorkshire Police in all ranks up to and including Chief Superintendent in charge of criminal justice for the force and was the interface with the Crown Prosecution service and the Courts from 2003 to 2007, and that on retirement was awarded the Queen's Police Medal for distinguished service in Her Majesty's Birthday Honours list in 2007.

12. LPACT and Serco PECS' attendance at the specialist panel technically came to an end in 2018, when due to restructuring and cost saving within the Prison Service and The Metropolitan Police, the embedded Prison Service Governors were not replaced following their retirement and the roles of the Detectives were expanded. From that time LPACT ceased to operate in its previous form. The relationship between Serco PECS and LPACT was in my view very effective during the time that I was involved. Had the Metropolitan Police sought to include Serco PECS in briefings associated with Operation Ankaa, the LPACT forum would have provided both the framework and security to do so in confidence and at a level of sufficient clearance to circulate intelligence from PNC, CRIMINT or Mercury as myself, Trevor Brading & Pete Masters were all SC Vetted. Speaking for myself, I have been involved in a number of successful anti-corruption investigations which were conducted by way of cooperation between Serco PECS and other LPACT panel members and associated teams. LPACT was a forum that included a number of embedded Custodial Prison Service Governors, experienced Detectives, experienced Serco PECS Managers and the senior Prison Service Managers responsible for the PECS Contract and where necessary I would provide sensitive Intel from Serco PECS to LPACT, to assist them to develop intelligence on which they were already working.
13. Any Crimint entries associated with escape corruption/conspiracy would have or at least should have been discussed during LPACT meetings and I would have expected any Crimint entry suggestive of Serco involvement with escape corruption to be paired with the LPACT meeting Minutes. I can see that documents were searched for using the search-term "LPACT" but we have not been provided with LPACT meeting minutes.
14. Corruption is a broad term in this context in that it can range from inadvertently overstepping professional boundaries to actively assisting an offender. Instances of corruption could include smuggling contraband such as cigarettes and alcohol or more serious forms of collusion such as smuggling mobile phones, drugs and even sharing of sensitive