

This advice is being provided following a meeting with SFC-1 FE14, TFC FE16, SIO -DI Murray and others at [Sensitive] on 3rd December 2015.

I have previously prepared further tactical advice relating to other Op ANKAA deployments and this advice relates to an armed deployment on Friday 11th December 2015.

I have had several detailed telephone conversations with TFC in relation to the developing intelligence picture. Detailed telephone discussions with the TFC and SIO.

I have also had the opportunity to read the FA1 and FA2 and attached document. I have noted the threat assessment and the initial working strategy.

The full intelligence picture is detailed and therefore not repeated here.

However, intelligence suggests a possibility of any offences being committed within central and/or North London. Although at this time the intended location is unknown.

As discussed verbally with the SFC and TFC the operation will be supported by two armed surveillance teams. This will provide the TFC with the capacity to provide an armed deployment to the known subjects and a further deployment to provide armed support around the movement of the escort and subject within.

CTSFO officers will have the ability to provide a further team and reactive 'jump-off' option. This will allow the TFC a full range of tactical options to cater for any developing intelligence.

The following advice provides advice in relation to an imprecise situation where any offence venue is unknown (MAST support) and also provides for a security and protection armed deployment utilising armed surveillance officers with CTSFO support to maintain control of the escort. It is intended at this time for covert deployment around the escort as to alert persons of police knowledge of subjects intended actions may result in disruption only, for the offence to be reinacted at a later date when not under police control and a reasonably anticipated tactical response cannot be planned or initiated in full. Therefore if the subjects actions were to take place at a later date it is likely it would result in the absence of mitigation to the risks and thus increasing risks to potential future victims.

Notwithstanding the above, if intelligence indicates uncontrolled elements/subjects toward the escort, the TFC can utilise the contingency assets assigned and can promptly adopt a discreet protection method or can provide a overt protection package. This will provide a significant visible armed deterrent to any attempt by the subjects intending to complete armed criminality toward the escort, and likewise, an overt and covert armed presence will be instigated upon the escort arrival at the known location - Wood Green Crown Court.

The overarching TFC will be located remotely in the Crime Command suite and will have direct access to CTSFO tactical advisor along with intelligence updates. At this time I am aware ground assigned TFCs will be located with the covert armed CTSFO assets. Instant radio communications with the overarching TFC and ground TFCs, firearms and surveillance assets will be in use.

At this time there is no detailed intelligence in relation to offence methodology or armaments, although as the intelligence develops there maybe a consideration for the issue/deployment of EMOE specific for this operation as a contingency for [Sensitive] and would require further authorisation.

(EMOE is carried under standing authority for on duty CTSFO team)

RESTRICTED  
Form FA 5

**"Compliant Stop"** This is where the subject voluntarily pulls over to the side of the road when signaled to do so.

**"Enforced Stop"** This is where the subject vehicle is brought to rest without prior warning, by the positioning of police vehicles to provide containment. This may necessitate vehicles approaching from the rear, side, or the opposite direction.

Once the vehicle has come to rest the subjects can be dealt with by utilising a numbers of tactics, these include, Armed Enquiry, Containment, Communication and Extraction.

This will be determined by the application of the NDM based upon factors such as numbers of subjects, their actions, and the perceived level of threat.

Implications and considerations

- Interception location and time can be carried out when it was safest for police and public
- Risks to all persons can be minimised through careful planning and co-ordination
- Removes vulnerabilities encountered when dealing with innocent persons at a fixed location
- Enables more effective positive identification of subject prior to arrest
- Reduces opportunity for destruction of evidence
- Increased element of surprise which is tactically advantageous and may increase safety through restriction of opportunity
- Takes armed operation into public domain increasing risk to public.
- Operation is more unpredictable than at a fixed location and therefore more difficult to control
- Increased risk of escape over an operation at a fixed location as containment is more difficult to achieve
- Operation is resource and time intensive

On many MASTS based deployments a Covert armed vehicle interception utilising 'Enforced Stop' and 'Extraction' is often the preferred tactical option. It is accepted that this is a rapidly implemented tactic to dominate the occupants of a vehicle - its use must be proportionate to the threat posed. On some occasions it may be appropriate not to immediately extract occupants but to contain them and call them out under control.

In a covert interception the use of blue lights and sirens immediately prior to interception is not normally carried out as it is anticipated that the non compliant actions of the subject would lead to them trying to make off. However, in some circumstances it may be assessed that the activation of warning equipment in the final seconds before the car is stopped may increase awareness of Police presence whilst minimizing the risk of a pursuit / breakout.

**Overt support to Covert operations**

On some operations it may be appropriate to consider the support of overt ARV crews to assist in carrying out a vehicle interception. This could be for a number of reasons including any uncertainty in relation to the firearms intelligence and also the need to hide the fact that a covert operation is being undertaken. In circumstances where the firearms intelligence is weak it may be more appropriate for overt crews to undertake a Natural or Compliant stop with an armed enquiry.

**Incidental Contact**

SCO19 officers are trained, and authorised to make incidental contact with subject vehicles, using police vehicles in order to carry out an enforced vehicle stop. Additionally officers may exercise their judgement in forcing vehicle contact, in circumstances where it is believed decamp of an armed suspect may present a danger to the public.

**Ram Rounds**

SCO19 Firearms teams are trained to fire a tyre deflation shotgun round if immediate driver compliance is not obtained. This is a police and public safety contingency which prevents a breakout and high speed

pursuit. Weapons are only discharged when officers are on foot and the vehicle has already been blocked.

**Small Team Intervention Capability (STIC)**

In circumstances where prevention of threats to life or violent offences are part of the strategic intention, a small team intervention capability (STIC), can be provided in addition to the firearms team. This will involve a small group of officers [redacted] capable of covert forward deployment and integration with surveillance. This provides additional covert options to the TFC which increase capability and flexibility.

**Armed interception of subjects in premises**

**Small Team & Covert Support to arrest enquiries**

Dependent on the determined threat/risk to the police and public, SCO19 Firearms teams have the ability to deploy in a covert or discreet manner to premises. This can be used in the execution of a warrant or arrest enquiries and may be in support of unarmed officers if appropriate in the circumstances. The implementation of a discreet/covert containment may still be desirable in these circumstances.

**Implications & Considerations**

- This gives flexibility when discretion is required to maintain the integrity of a covert operation or where there are complex community impact issues.
- Such tactics are very much dependent on the perceived threat and subsequent risk to all parties and safety needs to be the paramount concern, taking precedent over investigative and intelligence gathering objectives.
- [redacted] Sensitive/irrelevant to ensure the premises can be properly contained to prevent escape, and officers are properly briefed prior to deployment.
- Enables armed officers to immediately respond to any threat in the appropriate manner
- [redacted] Sensitive/irrelevant
- Contains the policing operation into a defined area reducing public impact and danger
- Minimises disruption to the community
- [redacted] Sensitive/irrelevant
- Involvement of potentially innocent persons at arrest location

[redacted] **Sensitive/irrelevant** [redacted]

**Containment & Call-out**

This option is a trained and practiced firearms deployment, for which SCO19 firearms teams providing MASTS support, are equipped to carry out [redacted]

[redacted] this option may be employed. [redacted]

[redacted] before being handed over to the Tactical Firearms Commander.

**Implications and considerations**

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- Reduces opportunity for potentially armed subject to escape detention
- Contains policing operation reducing public impact and danger

**Options 2** is the option which are most likely to achieve the strategic intention. They provide maximum protection to the public as it is the best opportunity to prevent substantive offences taking place and is considered to be the best balance between safety of all concerned and gaining evidence. By implementing these options the TFC has the best opportunity to gain control on the identified subject(s) and gain further intelligence around their intention and capability. This gives police the opportunity to arrest the subject(s) at the earliest opportunity if there is evidence to support their intention or of firearms possession. By utilising MASTS, surveillance control can be maintained on the subject(s). It is assumed that there may be some degree of preparation by the subjects prior to the commission of the offence. This may give clear indication of intent and would allow the opportunity to intercept prior to commission of the offence. **Clear tipping points** need to be established to ensure the subject(s) have no opportunity to come together with the escort. To allow this would give police little ability to quickly respond to any threat to life that takes place prior to an interception being directed by the TFC.

However these options are dependent on a number of factors existing at the same time:

- The ability of police to locate and maintain control of the subject(s), prior to any armed offence taking place
- The Tactical Firearms Commander ability to communicate a decision to respond at the optimum time, prior to the subject(s) committing any substantive offence which puts any persons at risk, balanced against acts which are merely preparatory to any actual offence.
- The armed officers being able to position themselves forward enough to quickly respond without alerting the subject to police presence and understanding where the subject(s) and any vehicles are located as well as the evidence available

**Option 3** is not an option to plan for because of the risk to life of all parties including the general public. It is a contingency option and if because of prevailing circumstance a threat to life suddenly and unexpectedly occurs, armed intervention during an offence may need to be considered by the Tactical Firearms Commander. This would be dependent on any immediate threat to life and as an option may have to be considered by the Tactical Firearms Commander acting in liaison with the SCO19 Operational Firearms Commander.

**Option 4** is not an option to plan for because of the risk to life to all parties including the general public. It is a contingency option and if because of prevailing circumstance a threat to life suddenly and unexpectedly occurs, armed intervention during an offence may need to be considered by the Tactical Firearms Commander. This would be dependent on any immediate threat to life and as an option may have to be considered by the Tactical Firearms Commander acting in liaison with the SCO19 Operational Firearms Commander.

**Options 5** presents similar risks to the public and victims by allowing an offence to take place and therefore should be considered a contingency option. Unless the subjects were apprehended close to the scene, to keep ongoing control of subjects fleeing the scene of a offence without the proper support could lead to any of the following occurring: surveillance compromise and an ensuing high speed vehicle chase, which would further endanger the public, lead to loss of evidence or possible escape of the subjects. Additionally it is likely that if multiple subjects are involved they may also quickly split up on leaving the scene, which would leave police with an unmanageable situation due to a lack of resources. It is therefore not an option which is likely to meet the strategy. However it may have to be considered if an offence suddenly and unexpectedly takes place and police did not have an opportunity to respond until after the event.

An open mind should be retained for the use of further options depending on the progress of the intelligence gained during the operation – nothing should be ruled out and re-assessments should be made at appropriate

junctions. This would reduce the risk to all parties, including the general public.

**Specific advice in relation to the intelligence provided.**

It is not possible to predict the tactical option which would be most likely to achieve success within the working strategy at this time. All of the likely scenarios, along with their implications and considerations, have been recorded within this document. It is recommended that the TFC explore the evidential and intelligence thresholds in detail to ensure the OFC is in the best position to understand when an interception / arrest is likely to be required. This will enable resources to be deployed more effectively and increase the chances of a successful deployment.

If further intelligence develops relating to a fixed location armed offence then this FTA should be reviewed at the earliest opportunity and the FTA recorded by the FTA/TFC/OFC.

The following options for the transportation and escort protection deployment are for the consideration of the TFC. The SEG are specially trained to carry out Armed Escorts Operations and are armed MPS resource to be considered for use for this operation.

However, the SEG are NOT covert armed police asset.

As discussed above any disruption by use of overt police action is likely to result in risks at a later date to unknown victims/ members of public..

If further tactical support is required to this operation, this can be resourced by CTSFOs from SCO19.

**Tactical Convoy Configurations**

1. Unarmed discreet escort (SEG)
2. Armed discreet escort (SEG)
3. Unarmed overt escort (SEG)
4. Armed overt escort (SEG)
5. Armed covert escort with SCO19 enhanced protection & MASTS deployable CTSFO team

**1. Unarmed Discreet Escort**

If the threshold of the intelligence does not warrant an armed deployment, but there are other issues determined by application of the National Decision Model, that indicate that more than normal uniform policing response is required to provide a protective package. Then consideration may be given to utilising the training and expertise of the Special Escort Group configured in an appropriate manner.

Having identified the threat and risk, an appropriate control measure to ensure safety and confidentiality, would be to adopt a discreet approach to the protection and escort.

**Considerations and implications**

- Provides a discreet method of movement unlikely to disturb the environment.
- Uses officers trained in plain clothes policing methods
- Uses officers trained in escort policing methods
- Uses officers trained in advanced driving skills.
- Uses teamwork and communication skills.
- Uses the observation skills of officers regularly undertaking this type of work.
- The escort can be configured in accordance with the operational and security needs.