

Continuation of Statement of Laurence Taylor

2.2 As noted above, the individual holding this role is responsible and accountable for practice, policy, training for armed policing. This was the case in 2015. It should be recognised that there is a difference between ultimate authority and designated authority. Ultimate authority is held by the Commissioner through the relevant Assistance Commissioner (AC). However the designated authority is as described.

2.3 These responsibilities are fulfilled (now and in 2015) by:

2.4 The structure for the management of practice, policy and training in armed policing and the roles and responsibilities of the individuals within that structure, both in 2015 and now, is as follows:

2.5 **Firearms Training**

- (i) **The Chief Firearms Instructor** is responsible for the management governance and delivery of all firearms training in the MPS under a license issues by the college of policing.
- (ii) **The CFI is line managed** by a Superintendent HQ at SCO19 under the command of a Chief Supt who is OCU Commander of SCO19.
- (iii) **The Chief Superintendent SCO19** oversees the entirety of SCO19 the Specialist Firearms Command & reports to the Commander Uniform Operations.

2.6 **Firearms Operations**

- (i) **CTSFOs Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers (Constables).**
- (ii) **CTSFO Sergeant** CTSFOs are line managed by CTSFO Sergeants who become the Operational Firearms Commanders OFCs in live deployments.
- (iii) **CTSFO Inspector** CTSFO sergeants are line managed by CTSFO Inspectors who are the tactical advisors in live operations.
- (iv) **Chief Inspector CTSFO Operations** The CTSFO portfolio is line managed by a Chief Inspector Specialist Operations.
- (v) **Superintendent CT&Spec Ops** The CTSFO CI is line managed by the Superintendent Counter Terrorism and Specialist Operations who presides over a number of portfolios including: CTSFO Operations, Specialist Capabilities, Organisational Learning, Post Incident Management & Professional Standards. This officer reports to the Chief Supt OCU

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Commander SCO19.

- (vi) **The Chief Superintendent SCO19** oversees the entirety of SCO19 the Specialist Firearms Command & reports to the Commander Uniform Operations.

2.7 Firearms Command

- (i) **The Operational Firearms Commander OFC** is in operational command. They command a group of officers carrying out functional or territorial responsibilities related to a tactical plan.
- (ii) **The Tactical Firearms Commander TFC** is in tactical command. Develops, commands and coordinates the overall tactical response in accordance with strategic objectives.
- (iii) **The Strategic Firearms Commander** Determines the strategic objectives and sets any tactical parameters. Retains strategic oversight and overall command and responsibility. Authorises the deployment of firearms officers.

2.8 The Chief Officer Strategic Hierarchy

- (i) The Commander Uniformed Operations (Cmdr Armed Policing (AP)) owns policy, training and chairs the Armed Policing Delivery Group (APDG)
- (ii) The Deputy Assistant Commissioner Operations (DAC Ops) provides Standing Authority and chairs the Armed Policing Strategic Board (APSB)
- (iii) The Assistant Commissioner Met Ops ensures consistency across business groups.
- (iv) The Commissioner has ultimate vicarious liability for actions of all officers

2.9 Each of the three hierarchy's detailed above **training, operations** and **command** feed into the Chief Officer Hierarchy. The Chief Supt SCO19 and the SFCs ultimately feed into the Chief Officer Oversight structure described above.

2.10 The Deputy Assistant Commissioner Met Operations can be described as having vicarious responsibility for armed deployments (in 2015 and now), insofar as they perform the role of 'Chief Officer', where Chief Officer is defined or described in APP-AP, either directly or through the Commander Uniform Operations. This is manifest through their appointment of SFCs and by their oversight of policy, procedure and strategic governance. The role of the Chief Officer is, essentially, to ensure compliance with the APP, ensure consistency of training and ensure that all those involved in the command and deployment of firearms operations are occupationally

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and operationally competent. However for day to day deployments of armed officers, the designated senior authority and therefore responsibility rests with the SFC, in so far as the SFC is not required or expected to obtain individual sign off what they are authorising from a chief officer. Therefore neither I nor the Commander AP would expect to see operational plans or authorities prior to a deployment. This is not required by APP-AP as this is the role of the SFC. It would also confuse the command of operations were a Chief Officer to become involved in operational decision making and would risk misunderstanding. Also, the volume of armed operations would be too great. To put this into context it takes 7 full time SFCs supported by a small number of other SFCs, who also have other roles, to full fill this requirement in the MPS

2.11 Whilst not directly involved in individual operations, I do agree that the role involves a vicarious Article 2 duty to consider the minimisation of risk to life in respect of firearms policy and training. This is a consideration when providing strategic oversight to matters such as the Armed Policing Strategic Risk Assessment process, the selection of kit and equipment, the setting of training requirements, the sign off of various standing authorities, as well as other areas overseen through the ADPG and APSB.

3. MPS Firearms Policy – Policy Framework

3.1 At present Met Operations is headed by Assistant Commissioner (AC) Louisa Rolfe. DAC Ops is Barbara Grey. This is the post I performed until very recently. Uniformed Operations is headed by Commander Kyle Gordon. His portfolio includes firearms.

3.2 In 2015 the AC for this area of business was Pat Gallan, the DAC Peter Terry and Commander Armed Policing was Dave Musker.

3.3 The structure of armed policing and my role within it, is described in the MPS Police Use of Firearms (PUoF) 2020 Introduction Page 11 - 15. The relevant sections are detailed below in italics however by way of an introduction I would summarise it as

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which a number of tactics can be deployed for dealing with suspects on foot in buildings and in vehicles. It is important for the SFC to detail which if any tactics deployable from the MASTs platform they give the TFC authority to implement. It would not be unusual for a SFC to authorise a TFC to deliver all of the available tactics at the start of the operation, as it would be difficult to be certain how an operation would end. This very much depends where the intelligence and the suspects themselves take the covert deployment. There is a danger in being too prescriptive and unnecessarily limiting the TFC. If the SFC feels that certain tactics should not be implemented then the SFC can place tactical parameters on the deployment. These points have been reaffirmed to firearms commanders in the MPS in the wake of the recommendations from the Anthony Grainger Inquiry via mandatory refresher training for all SFCs TFCs OFCs and Tactical advisors.

6. Whether the relevant firearms policies and procedures were appropriately applied in Operation Ankaa.

6.1 On the basis of the material I have seen (Supts McKibbins 1st, 2nd and 3rd statements together with the CFIs statement, coupled with the experts report written by Arundale and Burrows), my clear view is that the relevant policies and procedures were followed during operation Ankaa. It is not possible within the time afforded to me to conduct a full internal review of Operation Ankaa prior to this Inquiry. I have, however, had sight of Supt. McKibbin's response to this question, and again I endorse the comments he makes in his statement. In summary, it appears to me that it was proportionate and appropriate for the operation to go ahead, as disrupting the offence would not have achieved sustained public protection and could well have alerted the suspects to the fact that their plans had been compromised. A disruption action would not have put the interests of the public ahead of the interests of the suspects and would likely have resulted in another break out attempt at a future date and time, when the authorities would likely not have the same intelligence feeds or control of the circumstances. It seems to me that this is exactly what eventually occurred in Turkey, following Izzet Eren's transfer. Having made (in my view

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correctly) the decision to allow the conspiracy to go ahead, I am satisfied that the deployment on the day was in accordance with both national policy APP and MPS policy regarding the Police Use of Firearms, for the reasons given by Supt. McKibbin. I would go on to say that I fully endorse his statements in relation to these issues.

7. **Whether there is any policy or guidance about consulting the Crown Prosecution Service to discuss the evidential threshold that needed to be reached before the conspiracy should be brought to a conclusion.**

7.1 I can confirm that there is currently no policy or guidance about consulting the Crown Prosecution Service to discuss the evidential threshold that needs to be reached before an arrest for conspiracy can be considered. In a fast moving operation, such as Operation Ankaa, where the intelligence picture was constantly changing and where the co-conspirators were unknown to the police, CPS input of this nature would have provided little benefit.

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