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**PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF JERMAINE BAKER**

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**Witness Statement of Philip Taylor**

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**Background:**

1. I am the Chief Firearms Instructor (CFI) for the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). I have been a Firearms Officer for 13 years. In that time, I have performed the role of an operational Armed Response Vehicle (ARV) Officer and Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officer (CTSFO) from the rank of Sergeant to Chief Inspector.
2. In terms of command and control, I am an Operational and Tactical Firearms Commander. I have performed the role of Firearms Tactical Advisor at all levels of competence for in excess of 12 years.
3. I have also been a Firearms Instructor for the past 11 years, conducting firearms training between operational deployments at various ranks, prior to taking the role of CFI in November 2019. In addition to being the MPS CFI, I am also the CFI responsible for the National Explosive Method of Entry (EMoE) and National Counter Terrorist Specialist Firearms Officer (CTSFO) network training being delivered across the UK.

## **The role and responsibilities of the CFI:**

4. In my capacity as the MPS CFI, I am responsible for the quality assurance and authorisation of all firearms & Taser training delivered by accredited firearms & Taser Instructors within the MPS. This involves confirming that courses are College of Policing (CoP) and National Firearms Training Curriculum (NPFTC) compliant, and that the training achieves the criteria required to fulfil each particular armed 'Role Profile'. MPS firearms training is also externally moderated, quality assured and licenced through the CoP.
5. The MPS firearms unit (SCO19) is responsible for delivering all initial courses and continuation training to approximately 2850 Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs) across a number of role profiles and Operational Commands Units (OCUs).
6. As CFI I hold responsibility and governance for the delivery of training in respect of the following role profiles:

### Baseline MPS Role Profiles

- (a) AFO: Protective Security
- (b) AFO: Aviation Security
- (c) AFO: Mounted Armed Escort
- (d) AFO: SEG - Special Escort Group
- (e) Close Protection Officer
- (f) Armed Surveillance Officer
- (g) Armed Response Vehicle Officer (ARV)
- (h) Standard MASTS Officer (MASTS)
- (i) Specialist Firearms Officer (SFO)
- (j) Counter Terrorist Specialist Firearms Officer (CTSFO)

### Additional Skills Profiles

- (a) National Rifle Officer (NRO)
- (b) Tactical Rifle Officer (TRO)
- (c) National Firearms Instructor (NFI)

### Command Role Profiles

- (a) Operational Firearms Commander (OFC)
- (b) Initial Tactical Firearms Commander (I/TFC)
- (c) Cadre Tactical Firearms Commander (C/TFC)
- (d) CTSFO Ground Tactical Firearms Commander
- (e) Firearms Tactical Advisor (TA)
- (f) Post Incident Manager (PIM)
- (g) Strategic Firearms Commander (SFC)
- (h) Specialist SFC & TFC

Responsibility for the delivery and governance of the SFC initial course and the SFC and TFC specialist course are held by the College of Policing, as is the 5 year re-accreditation training for these programmes. The MPS CFI, however, holds responsibility for the delivery of yearly command refreshers in respect of both role profiles.

### Issuing & Armoury Role Profiles

- (a) Police Weapons Issuing Officer (WIO)
- (b) Police Weapons Maintainer
- (c) Police Armourer

### Taser Role Profiles

- (a) Specially Trained Officer (STU)
- (b) Taser Instructor

- (c) Taser Lead Instructor
- (d) Taser Technician
- (e) Taser Downloader
- (f) Taser Issuing Officer
- (g) AEP (Baton Gun) Operator Taser AEP Operator

**Policies and reference material:**

7. The policies and reference materials for firearms training that are currently in use overlap to a significant extent with those that were in place in 2015. As might be expected, the relevant documents are regularly updated.
8. The documents listed below contain what I regard to be the key materials used in the training of firearms officers on (among other things): the use of MASTS; contain and call out; dynamic intervention; extraction; the role of the TFC; and the role of the SFC.
  - (a) **Authorised Professional Practice - Armed Policing (APP-AP).**
    - (i) This document is produced and owned by the CoP. It is a live document and is regularly updated electronically on the CoP secure website used to store training materials. The secure website was known as POLKA at the time of the incident; since March 2020 it has been known as Knowledge Hub.
    - (ii) The current version of APP-AP is publicly available online [INSERT REF/URN].<sup>1</sup>
    - (iii) While there have been updates and amendments since 2015, (such as to the definition of “less lethal” options), the version in place in late 2015 [INSERT REF/URN] and the current iteration of AP-APP are structured in the same way. Both versions contain modules on the following topics: Legal framework; Use of force, firearms and less lethal weapons; Weapons and equipment, Issue and carriage

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/armed-policing/>

*and systematic manner. Priority should be given to the subject who poses the greatest threat based upon the available information and intelligence, and/or the driver in order to prevent the vehicle from being driven off. Then, for example, working clockwise so all the officers present can follow the intended order. Where possible sufficient numbers of officers should be deployed on the Extraction so as to gain control of all of the subject/s in the shortest possible time frame. Officers approaching the subject's vehicle should visually and verbally identify themselves as armed officers. Having approached the door, it should be opened by the officer and if the seat is occupied the subject should be assisted from the vehicle, placed on the ground and detained. This should be accompanied by the repeated command, 'Out, Down'. If the occupant is wearing a seatbelt they should be told to remove it but their hands should be closely observed.*

*Due to the close proximity of other armed officers continual awareness of the potential of exposure to fire from other officers, or exposing them to fire, should be maintained. Subjects may refuse to open the door of a locked vehicle or the vehicle may have darkened or mirrored windows. It may be necessary to break the glass by striking the corner of a window using an appropriate device. A police firearm should not routinely be used for this purpose, however it may be that due to the perceived level of threat in a spontaneous situation, no other options are immediately available. It must be remembered that the use of a police weapon for these purposes may result in muzzle damage, the alteration or removal of sights, and the possible discharge of the weapon. Reference should be made to the ACPO Manual of Guidance on Personal Safety as it relates to Vehicle Skills. Where seatbelts are worn it may be necessary to cut the fabric of the belt in order to remove the subject from the vehicle. An Extraction may be accompanied by the use of distractions such as pyrotechnics, or the breaking of the vehicles side windows on approach.*