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**RECOMMENDED FORMAT
FOR THE PRODUCTION OF RISK ASSESSMENTS
FOR COVERT TACTICS**

THE 'PLAICE' MODEL

**PRODUCED BY THE
Covert Policing Standards Unit (CPSU)
SCD14**

January 2010

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RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR COVERT TACTICS
EXPLANATORY NOTES

These papers have been produced to assist officers prepare and produce appropriate risk assessments whilst engaged in covert operations. The requirement to assess the risks in such operations is not a new concept and operational officers have understood the need for risk management for some years. That said, the MPS have used a number of different formats, none of which are totally suitable for covert policing. These papers advocate the use of the PLAICE model, a tried and tested formula produced by the Covert Policing Standards Unit (CPSU) as a bespoke template for covert tactics. Use of this model will maintain a corporate and standardised risk management process, and at the same time, enhance the MPS Corporate Risk Management Business Group methodology.

CPSU are currently setting up Risk Management training courses for officers engaged in covert tactics throughout the MPS, when this model will be discussed in more detail. A list of trained officers will be made available who will act as advisors. All CPSU staff have been trained in risk management and are available to assist where required. Contact details are available on the CPSU web site.

- This document is current protectively marked as RESTRICTED, however this may change depending on the content of the completed form.
- **Form A** is the PLAICE model template and is self-explanatory.
- The process requires an assessment with current control measures, identifying whether further measures are required and then reassess the level of risk.
- The notes will document the thought process for the assessment, in order that any later analysis can be made objectively.
- **Form B** assists the assessor in determining the most appropriate level of likelihood and impact.
- The assessor must be aware of the purpose for control measures. Sometimes it has to be acknowledged that the risk cannot be minimised and will therefore be tolerated.
- The resultant scoring will determine the level of risk.
- **Form C** acts as an Aide Memoir to assist assessors in identifying relevant risks. This list is not exhaustive and each covert operation will have it's own risks.
- This risk assessment does not replace the need for health & safety risk assessments to be completed. Forms RA1, RA2 and RA3 are available on AWARE.
- Assessors must be aware that all risk assessments will require continual monitoring and update. Any claim of negligence or lack of duty of care made against the MPS will be exacerbated by an out of date or poorly serviced risk assessment.

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Form A

COVERT OPERATIONS RISK ASSESSMENT

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OPERATIONAL BUSINESS RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Ref.	Date completed	Reviewing Officer	Reason for risk assessment	Branch/OCU
	17/11/2015	DC Andy Sparks	TSU Deployment	SCO7(7), Sensitive

Operation Name	Utara	ENTER GPMS CLASSIFICATION
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Review Record

Date next review due	Date Review carried out:	Name of person conducting review:	Initials:

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Methodology

Operation Utara (McQueen) is an investigation into an OCN engaged in the importation and supply of controlled class A drugs.

This part of the operation is designated McQueen and is directed against two specific individuals who are currently at HMP Wormwood Scrubs and a third member, Ozcan EREN, who plans to assist those offenders in escaping lawful custody. The OCN plan to utilise a black Audi A6, KM13YPT, that is parked at Eastern Road, N22 in effecting that escape.

Hazard Description	Existing Controls	Risk Assessment			Additional Risk Control measures	Residual Risk Assessment			
		Impact (0-5)	Likelihood (0-5)	Total Score		Impact (0-5)	Likelihood (0-5)	Total Score	
P	Subjects have previous convictions for firearms but no current intelligence that Ozcan has ready access at his H/A	The two main subjects are incarcerated within the HMP system. Ozcan EREN resides in central London.	3	1	4	Subjects vehicle is parked in a secluded car park some distance from any known addresses.	2	1	2
	Compromise of Deployment by Subject:	This is not in sight of the subjects home address or where the target vehicle has previously parked	3	1	4	SCO7(7) operatives will be deployed to put in an intervention if required	2	1	2
	Compromise of TSU assets during installation:	The deployment of equipment will be managed by trained TSU staff with support of SCO7(7)	3	1	3	Cover stores will be used as appropriate	2	1	2
			3	1	3		2	1	2

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	Neighbours: The car park is overlooked by the residents of the flats, but not on the ground floor, and is walled. It is overlooked by the rear of a house in an adjacent street but not clearly visible. There are no known links between any of the subjects and this venue.	Night time observations of plot indicate that neighbours is asleep during the hours of the proposed deployment.				Perimeter team will be in place to put in an intervention if required			
L	Authorities required for deployment of assets:	Authorities have been granted to allow deployment of planned assets and are valid	1	1	2	R v Sutherland requires Operational team/TSU staff to check Authorities prior to deployment	1	1	2
A	Control of Plot:	Minimum of 5 P9/Nationally trained officers to act as Perimeter team	2	1	3	TSU Duty team sergeant will task them on the evening to maximise control of plot.	1	1	2
I	Exposure of restricted/confide	Operational team will hold a briefing with TSU and	1	1	1	N/A	1	1	1

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FORM B

LIKELIHOOD (L)

Likelihood	Scale	Descriptor
Very Low	1	<u>Unlikely to occur</u> No record of previous occurrence; Assessed at 0 – 20% chance of occurring; Not likely to occur within next 24 months
Low	2	<u>Potential to occur</u> Has occurred but not in past 12 months; Assessed at 21 – 40% chance of occurring; Likely to occur within next 12 – 24 months
Medium	3	<u>Possibly will occur</u> Has occurred within last 12 months; Assessed at 41 – 60% chance of occurring; Likely to occur within next 12 months
High	4	<u>Probably will occur</u> Has occurred within last 6 months; Assessed at 61 – 80% chance of occurring; Likely to occur within next 6 months
Very High	5	<u>Almost certain to occur</u> Has occurred within last month; Assessed at 81 – 100% chance of occurring; Likely to occur within next month

IMPACT (I)

IMPACTS	Very Low (1)	Low (2)	Medium (3)	High (4)	Very High (5)
Physical Psychological Risks to people Risks to property/equipm ent	No risk of significant injury to persons, inc officers, subjects, public, etc. Relevant properties all structurally safe and readily protected Locations offer high welfare standards	Minor risk of injury and/or ill-health i.e. first aid type injury, limited distress Relevant properties all of reasonably safe construction and offer reasonable protection Locations offer reasonable welfare facilities and	Significant injury and/or ill-health i.e. doctor, RIDDOR, Counselling Relevant properties offer moderate protection and/or are of moderate construction Locations offer some protection against	Major injury and/or ill-health i.e. hospital, breakdown, etc. Relevant properties structurally unsound and/or offer very limited protection Locations offer minimum protection from elements and/or	One or more fatalities and/or serious long term psychological damage Relevant properties structurally dangerous and/or exposed and difficult to defend Locations offer no protection from elements and no welfare provisions

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- To calculate the overall risk rating, simply multiply the allocated impact score by the likelihood score i.e.

$$\text{LIKELIHOOD SCORE (L)} \times \text{IMPACT SCORE (I)} = \text{RISK RATING SCORE}$$
- The RISK RATING SCORE can then be interpreted using the threat matrix detailed below, which also includes some possible actions
- Note that individual scores can be allocated against the selected categories or taken as an average.

OVERALL RISK RATING SCORE MATRIX

LIKELIHOOD SCORES	Very High (5)	5 (Low)	10 (Medium)	15 (Medium)	20 (High)	25 (High)
	High (4)	4 (Low)	8 (Medium)	12 (Medium)	16 (Medium)	20 (High)
	Medium (3)	3 (Low)	6 (Low)	9 (Medium)	12 (Medium)	15 (Medium)
	Low (2)	2 (Low)	4 (Low)	6 (Low)	8 (Medium)	10 (Medium)
	Very Low (1)	1 (Low)	2 (Low)	3 (Low)	4 (Low)	5 (Low)
OVERALL RISK RATING SCORE		Very Low (1)	Low (2)	Medium (3)	High (4)	Very High (5)
IMPACT SCORES						

INTERPRETING THE SCORES - OVERALL RISK RATING MATRICES

Score	Rating	Action
20-25	High	Do not proceed unless an absolute operational

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FORM C

Risk Identifiers (PLAICE)

Here are some examples but you need to consider each identifier thoroughly, and remember that this list is not exhaustive. This risk assessment does not replace the need for health & safety risk assessments to be completed. Forms RA1, RA2 and RA3 are available on AWARE.

<p>Physical</p> <p>(Risks relating to the security of premises and people)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the operations room/operational arena 'secure'? • Is an alarm fitted & procedure in place for activation? • Is a 'Red care' monitoring installed? • Are key holders appropriate? • Has someone been allocated to 'manage' the alarm system? • Does everyone have a 'unique' alarm access code? • Has an access control system been installed? • Has the hostage/panic facility been activated? • Have the locks been changed at time of occupation? • Is there integrity of the keys and combinations? • Has a duplicate set of keys and combinations been lodged and is the location appropriate? • Does the operation possess 'secure' briefcases for carrying sensitive documents? • Are the cleaners the subject of vetting and are cleaning arrangements conducive to operational security? • Are window locks fitted to all windows? • Are the premises 'overlooked' and are blinds fitted and used?
<p>Legal</p> <p>(Risks relating to the legislative environment of the operation including RIPA, Disclosure/PI, & Political issues)</p>	<p>Are appropriate authorities in place?</p> <p>Is there a system to ensure authorities remain valid and is a 'gatekeeper' involved in the process?</p> <p>Has a disclosure officer been involved from the commencement of the operation?</p> <p>Has an exhibits officer been involved from the commencement of the operation?</p> <p>Has the possibility of PII been adequately considered and contingencies put in place?</p> <p>Have dedicated solicitors/counsel been involved from an early stage?</p> <p>Has the security implications of providing documents and extracts to the legal establishment,</p>

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	including the prosecution been considered?
<p style="text-align: center;">Assets</p> <p>(Risks associated with equipment, vehicles, IT controls, and includes partnerships and finance/budgets)</p>	<p>Are all the staff aware of the vulnerability of mobile communications? If challenged are all the staff aware of the 'cover story'? Are all staff currently vetted to the appropriate level? Do the staff, including the SIO, have experience in dealing with covert operations and have they received associated training? Has a Standing Operating Procedure for the operation been prepared and is it dynamic? Have appropriate access controls onto the operational database been implemented? Are removable hard drives provided? Have the floppy and CD/DVD drives been disabled? Is the system for backing up data regular and robust? Location/access to main server secure? Are contingency plans in place to maintain the IT equipment and soft ware? Has the operation team been provided with encrypted laptops and is the encryption to the required standard? Have any vehicles allocated to the operation been utilised against the targets previously? Has rotation been introduced/considered? Would awareness of the DVLC registered owner disclose ownership by law enforcement? Are the vehicles allocated to the operation (official and private 'blocked' and covertly marked on PNC? Are hire and lease vehicles booked by a covert or discrete source? Is there any evidence/intelligence of a threat from firearms?</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Information Management</p> <p>(Risks associated with information and knowledge management, including decision logs, communications, document security, policies & procedures)</p>	<p>Has the 'need to know' principle been introduced and are all staff aware of it? Has a 'clear desk' and 'clear wall' principle been introduced and do all staff have adequate secure cabinets to comply? Is the operation subject of structured 'indoctrination (inclusion) process'? Has a formal briefing and debriefing process been introduced? Are briefings documented and retained securely? Do all documents bear the appropriate protective marking classification and are they handled correctly? Has the operation been supplied with sufficient security furniture for the level of 'confidential/secret data'? Is all evidential material securely stored and access controlled?</p>

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	<p>Is there a policy on working at home and removal of documents from the office? Are the arrangements for dealing with 'confidential waste' adequate? Are the arrangements for dealing with redundant 'magnetic media' adequate? Does the SIO maintain a policy book/decision log? If appropriate has a separate 'covert' book been commenced? Has media strategy been agreed and is it dynamic? Are the arrangements for delivery of mail and despatch conducive to maintaining confidentiality (inc PO box facility)?</p>
<p>Compromise (Risks associated with potential/ actual compromise of the operation)</p>	<p>Are the subjects aware of covert techniques? Have the subjects 'compromised' covert techniques? Has consultation been made with Covert Operational Security Unit – SCD14? Does the use of hard back 'day books' give a potential for compromise? Is there a system in place for recording and reviewing 'suspicious incidents'?</p>
<p>Environmental (Risks associated with the operational working environment such as partner agencies and command structure. Also includes access/egress routes, overseas issues, community relations and exit strategy.)</p>	<p>Has the SIO assumed responsibility for Operational Security? Has someone been allocated specific responsibility for operation security (i.e. Operational security liaison Officer)? Is the location of the Operations room/arena conducive to operational security and or surveillance? Is there a 'transparency' within the operation that encourages reporting of unethical conduct in support of our values to respects and support each other and work as a team? If a 'joint operation', is the SIO satisfied as to the Operational Security regime of the partner agencies? Are routes to and from the operations room/operational arena frequently varied? Have agreed business continuity plans been introduced? Is there appropriate management 'resilience' to ensure operational continuity? Has covert deployment abroad occurred or is it considered? Has an exit strategy been prepared? Does a 'trusted friend' regime exist or is it 'open house'?</p>

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