

Q104 was invited to an over-arching briefing at 3pm on 10 December at New Scotland Yard for all units taking part in the operation the following day. (FE1 was unavailable at that time.) It was not feasible that everyone engaged on the Friday could attend, in particular the SFO teams and all surveillance operatives, due to competing pan London commitments that day. I ensured that at the least representatives were present.

I believed that such a pre briefing of this nature would be a useful exercise. There were four separate elements to the operational plan (the three surveillance deployments and the Control Room itself), and it was vital that each were aware of where they sat collectively and individually within the overall response and knew what we were seeking to achieve. There would be briefings at separate locations the following morning. The initial briefing provided the opportunity to ask questions, and for people to go away overnight to consider their responsibilities, discuss further amongst their own teams, and provide any suggestions as to how we might work efficiently together on the day. Although there was no formal requirement to audio record this briefing, (it was not a formal firearms briefing) I decided that in the interests of fairness and transparency that this would be the correct course of action.

During the evening of 10th December I received an intelligence update to indicate that the attempt to free Izzet EREN was still planned for the following day.

The Command Structure for Friday 11th December was as follows:

SFC: F14 (shadowed by FE15)

TFC 3000 FE16

TFC Team Alpha (Prison Van): Q104

TFC Team Bravo (Audi YPT): FE1 (shadowed by FE18)

Tactical Adviser: A48, who was co – located with me in Central 3000. Further advice was available to those ground assigned by respective SFO OFC's on each of the surveillance teams.

Recorded Firearms Briefings were held at around 5am at Alperton Traffic Garage (Team Alpha) and Quicksilver Patrol Base in Wood Green (Team Bravo).

Team Charlie, focussing on Ozcan EREN was brief at Holborn and I conducted a briefing for all staff at Central 3000 that morning. I positioned myself in the main control room with my tactical adviser and from where I could be directly briefed from the three surveillance deployments by a surveillance coordinator. There were two further side offices, one of which contained our intelligence support cell and one contained the live audio feed from the Audi KM13 YPT which had been successfully

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deployed. Those physically monitoring this equipment passed on what they had heard directly to other officers, who had the responsibility of coming through and immediately relaying to me what they had been told. I was conscious that these were live updates, with potentially a number of voices being heard, over talking and with no opportunity of immediate playback for review and clarity. I was in communication with both TFCs on the ground by phone and their respective SIO OFCs were in also in radio and telephone contact with the Tactical Adviser. FE14 and FE15 were not present throughout, but did join me in Central 3000 during the course of the morning to enquire how events were developing and observe from the rear. Neither played any part in my tactical decision making. That morning I reapplied the rationale for the deployment of firearms in conjunction with the National Decision Model and was satisfied that it remained valid. There was still insufficient intelligence or evidence to allow any effective or sustainable action to remove or permanently disrupt this conspiracy without the need for a firearms deployment.

The Audi KM13 YPT remained in situ in Eastern Road.

I maintained a hand written log of events, which consisted of an opening summary and then attached a grid I drew to assist me as a record of my decisions events as they unfolded and as an aide memoire. From my perspective, it was vital to always know at any given time where the subjects of the three individual surveillance deployments were located, in what was likely to be a fast moving and dynamic operation. I would therefore be able to assess and balance the threat and risk to all parties in line with the working strategy. I was assisted by an operator inputting relevant enquiries on to the logging system within the Control Room.

I had also printed some maps to assist me in visualising the locations being transmitted over the radio channels.

I reviewed my tipping points and gave particular thought to the location where I might decide to change from a covert to an overt deployment on the Prison Van en route to the court, if either the Audi did not move or there were no further intelligence updates. In my mind, the most likely route to the Crown Court remained via the North Circular Road and therefore I made a note of the main junctions the van would pass, which I would hear over the radio channel. I decided that as soon as the van had passed the A1 junction, I would request the switch to an overt response and took the view that this would need to be in place at least by the time the vehicle reached Finchley. This was communicated to my Tactical Adviser.

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