

I W80 make this statement of my own free will. I understand I do not have to say anything but it may harm my defence if I do not mention when questioned something I later rely on in court. This statement is true and may be given in evidence.

Signed..... W80
Dated..... 19/2/16.....

I was interviewed by the IPCC on the 4 February 2016. During that interview I indicated that I had already provided the IPCC with a detailed statement in which I set out my recollection of my involvement in this incident. I said that in order to assist the investigation I would listen to any questions asked and think carefully as to whether I could add anything to my earlier statement and if so to provide a further written statement. I have thought carefully and I set out below what I feel able to add to my earlier statement.

I cannot be certain now what information I received and at what stage. By the time we came to stop and detain the occupants of the subject vehicle I had received a lot of information, including the information that the crime would be firearms enabled. It may be that in my earlier detailed statement I have got the time that I was given specific information wrong but I was definitely given the information set out in my statement at some stage. It is also worth saying that as I was being told this was an authorised firearms operation it was obvious that there was some information that the crime would be likely to involve firearms, otherwise it would not have been an authorised firearms job. Having been told it was an authorised firearms operation I would not then go and ask what the intelligence was in relation to firearms, I would take that as read.

I have been asked if I recall being told that the risk assessment for this operation was initially set as low. I do now remember that at the Lincoln Rd main briefing on Friday 11th the information given by FE1 the TFC included the assessment that the risk to firearms officers was low. I do not recall being told that there was any intelligence as to how the gang might react on being confronted by armed police and I assume therefore that in the absence of any intelligence that they would be likely to fight their way out rather than surrender. This does not mean that there was no risk and this would be part only of our individual risk assessment in that we would do a dynamic risk assessment as we confronted the suspects. On the basis of the all of the information I received up to the point of having to confront the occupants of the vehicle I considered the risk to me and my colleagues to be high. W80

The term firearms enabled came over the radio on the main working channel and therefore I knew or believed this was coming from the control room 3000. At the time I believed this information had come from conversations between suspects in the Audi overheard by virtue of the listening device put in it earlier. Firearms enabled is not a term I remember hearing before but in my mind it meant that the occupants of the car, the suspects we were about to confront, were armed. At no time was I given any information to suggest that the weapon or weapons the suspects were armed with might be imitation.

I can remember opening the front passenger door. I do not remember whether I was able to open it fully or whether it was restricted by the size of the gap between the Audi and the vehicle to my right or to the nearside of the Audi. I do not remember the door closing itself. At that moment I would have had intense focus on establishing whether the front seat passenger had a gun and was about to shoot at us and so I was not focusing on the position of the car door.

I cannot add any detail to what I have said about the position of his hands. I have said that they moved quickly up to his chest. I could see both of his hands. Both moved at the same time. Both moved upwards towards his chest. His hands moved from a low position. I cannot be precise as to the exact moment I perceived that he was going for the bag and the precise moment that I made the decision to shoot. It would have been at some stage after he started to move his hands and before he reached the top of the bag. I was very aware that action beats re-action and that I could not wait until he removed a gun from his bag. It is likely that having made the decision to fire the male's hands would have moved further up before the round struck him and that is why the shot has struck his left wrist.

I have not myself been involved in a previous operation where shots have been fired at police. But I was aware of incidents when shots have been fired at police. One in particular is the incident which occurred in Park Royal north London called Operation Wondoola which occurred on 15 May 2007 when a suspect Terry Nicholas fired at police. I know one of the officers well in the Park Royal incident. I was not thinking about this specifically on the day but the fact is that it is not unheard of for suspects to fire at police.

Having heard the audio from inside the suspect vehicle I am not able to add any further detail. I could not see Mr Baker's face because of the balaclava. I cannot recall whether I had eye contact with him. I am sure I shouted put your hands on the dash. I was very close to him. At the time I believed he was aware of my shout. Notwithstanding what other people were shouting I was directly in front of him and telling him forcefully to put

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his hands on the dash. He would not have been able to see any other officer. He had the opportunity to put his hands on the dash. Had he done so I would not have fired. His lifting of his hands quickly from low in his lap area towards his chest caused me to believe he was going for a gun. That is why I shot him. At no time did I perceive that Mr Baker was raising his hands to surrender.

Having been shown a number of photographs taken at the post mortem I am not able to add any further detail to what I have said already about the position of Mr Baker's hands and arms at the time I decided that I had to shoot. WRO

Signed.....WRO..... Dated.....19/2/16.....