

STATEMENT OF WITNESS*(Criminal Procedure Rules, r. 16.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s. 9)*

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Statement of S48
 Age if under 18: Over 18
 Occupation: Police officer

This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it, anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

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Date: 12th April 2021

1. I write this statement following an email request I have received from the Directorate of Legal Services, Metropolitan Police, relating to a forthcoming Public Inquiry and in order to address a number of questions asked by the Inquiry Legal Team.
2. I was the firearms tactical advisor for Operation Ankaa from the outset, including on the deployment on 11th December 2015. I have previously supplied all documentation relevant to this Inquiry and will make reference to some of this submitted material.

The meeting on 3rd December 2015

3. On 3rd December 2015 I attended a police venue for a planning meeting regarding Operation Ankaa.
4. I made original notes regarding this meeting and subsequently provided a tactical advice document dated 3rd December 2015.
5. I refer to my original notes recorded in my day-book (Relativity reference IPC0000532). I listed two attendees at that meeting, those being the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) Rob Murray and the over-arching Tactical Firearms Commander (TFC) Neil Williams (FE16). I record the name and mobile phone number of a Detective Inspector Gosling from the Technical Support Unit (TSU) in what, I believe, is the following page of my day-book.
6. Due to the passage of time, I cannot say for certain if there were any other attendees at the meeting on 3rd December.
7. Later I provided a FA5 Tactical Advice document dated 3rd December 2015. In the preamble I refer to the meeting on 3rd December and indicate those persons with whom I liaised, that includes the Strategic Firearms Commander (SFC), the overarching TFC and a Detective Inspector from the TSU. Unfortunately, I cannot clarify any further.

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8. In my statement provided on 14th December 2015 I make reference to the attendees of the meeting on 3rd December as the SIO, the over-arching TFC, the SFC, and two CTSFOs. I do not remember who these latter officers were and cannot now assist to identify them.

Intelligence regarding named subjects and firearms

9. I have been shown the documents at Relativity references MPS0003635 – MPS0003647 (excluding MPS0003642) and I have been informed that these documents were created for the purpose of this Inquiry to set out the intelligence available to the MPS before 11th December 2015 in relation to the named subjects.
10. I cannot answer determinatively whether I was aware of the firearms intelligence contained in these documents.
11. I am supplied intelligence by the firearms command chain and the SIO. Accordingly, I would only be aware of intelligence provided via this route.
12. I was in receipt of an email communication from the TFC dated 7 December 2015 timed at 19:46 (Relativity reference IPC0001114), attaching profiles of Sinan Ozger, Izzet Eren, and Ozcan Eren and a document titled mx407 which set out “Other incidents in the feud between the Tottenham Turks/Tottenham Boys and the Hackney Turks/Bombacilar”. Therefore, I was aware of the firearms intelligence contained in those documents.
13. In relation to any of the firearms intelligence on documents MPS0003635 – MPS0003647 which is not contained in the attachments mentioned in the paragraph above, I would only have been aware of it if it was mentioned orally in meetings relating to Operation Ankaa, but I cannot now recall specifics.

Consideration of tactical options for 11th December 2015

14. I will now provide further requested detail into the tactical options considered in relation to the operation.
15. On 10th November 2015 I attended a meeting in relation to Operation Ankaa. I made notes in this meeting and have described the events in a statement I provided later.
16. During this meeting, a number of options were discussed, including the disruption of the criminal activity.

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17. Potential disruption tactics included sentencing of the subjects via remote means such as video link, sentencing without the presence of the subjects, and seeking an alternative but secure sentencing venue.
18. We also discussed variation of the transportation route, variation of the transportation methods, and replacing the prison guards with police officers. These methods were considered, but presented significant risks in relation to compromise of the operation if this was recognised as police activity by the imprisoned subjects, other inmates or potentially by prison employees.
19. If there was a disruption, we discussed the risks that would result from what would have to be a spontaneous firearms deployment in the event of an unexpected hospital visit by the imprisoned subject which could be used at a later date to attempt an armed escape plot. This would pose significant risks to public safety. We considered the risks presented by an unplanned and therefore reduced armed policing response. This could have involved armed response vehicle (ARV) officers being placed in a tactical scenario for which they would be untrained to perform appropriately (namely vehicle escort and protection) with a minimum of planning time. We had to factor in the capabilities, determination and threat posed by the subjects, the risks of compromise of the operation, and displacing the subjects to an uncontrolled and unmitigated later date, thereby not achieving public safety in the longer term. This thinking is summarised in note form in my original notes and later within my witness statement.
20. As I mention above, I attended a further planning meeting on 3rd December 2015 at which I also made notes; these are within my day-book. Contained within those original notes are references to the unknown identity of the subjects – although it is noted that there was thought to be ‘a proper team in place’ – and unknown location of subjects’ firearms. The basis of the subsequent technical deployment upon the stolen Audi was also noted.
21. The basis of a potential tactical plan was discussed and was noted for the 11th December sentencing at Wood Green Crown Court involving mobile armed support to surveillance (MASTS) together with other risks, mitigations and contingencies.
22. Also recorded within my original notes is ‘Dig-out options:- available’, which were also discussed and remained a considered tactical option, albeit, the likelihood, via intelligence, was the offence would be conducted by vehicle. This is a reference to a widely used firearms colloquialism and refers to the option of dealing with subjects in buildings by means of a containment and call out tactical option. Therefore, if the intelligence picture had changed in the interim period between the meeting and 11th December, and the subjects were identified, located and commanders were inclined – the subjects could have been arrested by use of this tactic. This is a frequently utilised tactical option where the identity and location of the subject is known, ideally together with the location of any criminally possessed firearms.

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23. Within my statement dated 14th December 2015, I expand further around some of these elements, such as risks to occupants of the escorted vehicle, including guards. This refers to the mitigation in place around the guarding staff, together with the possible interchange of the Serco guards with police covert assets. This option of using unarmed and armed covert assets was discounted due to the risk of compromise. Additionally, replacing guards with armed officers would increase the risk of confrontation with armed police if the transportation were to be attacked. If a covertly armed police officer within the prison van were to be challenged by an armed subject, the officers would in all likelihood be required to engage the subject without providing an oral warning / opportunity for the subject to respond. The placement of armed officer within this environment should be discouraged, because if this option were used police obligations under Article 2 ECHR ('any armed policing operation must be planned and controlled so as to minimise, to greatest extent possible recourse to lethal force and risk to the public') could be breached.
24. I also refer in my 14th December statement to 'other tactical options' which were discussed and subsequently documented. These options were ultimately recorded into my FA5 Tactical Advice.
25. My statement additionally makes reference to an overt visible deterrent option available in the form of marked ARVs and uniformed armed officers; this is also documented within submitted FA5 Tactical Advice documents.
26. I now refer to my final submitted FA5 for the deployment on 11th December.
27. This was a complex multi-faceted firearms operation with many recorded considerations, contingencies and mitigations.
28. The command structure was well developed with two ground assigned TFCs having functional responsibilities whilst working to the over-arching TFC, who was suitably located.
29. The tactical advice provided was comprehensive and detailed. It provides for enhanced protection of the escorted prison vehicle, armed arrest options for emerging threats potentially using the stolen Audi, further covert options in relation to small team intervention capability (STIC) provision, and protection and response options to the court premises, together with overt armed policing tactical options.
30. A number of viable, achievable, and proportionate tactical options achieving the hierarchical working strategy and overarching strategy, thereby mitigating the defined threat, were available to the relevant firearms commanders. These options are dependent upon variable factors, including an emerging and developing intelligence

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picture, which in turn included the armed escape plan methodologies, the defined threat posed, together with the operational and environmental factors.

31. The use of subjects in vehicles – Natural Stop – extraction was not a predetermined tactical option when deploying from a MASTS platform, as the submitted FA5 explains.
32. With the building intelligence picture on the morning of the 11th December 2015, the most appropriate tactical option in the circumstances was an armed interception of subjects in a vehicle by means of natural vehicle stop – extraction, as undertaken. Some of the implications and considerations of this tactical option are recorded in the available FA5.
33. I did not record when the decision to implement a natural stop and extraction was made, or who made it. It would have been made at an appropriate time to enable necessary instructions to be provided to those armed officers conducting the action.
34. There was no predetermined resolution to Operation Ankaa. A variety of tactical options were available as recorded within my day-book notes, documented tactical advice, and statements.
35. An appropriate chosen tactical option should mitigate and reduce the likelihood of harm occurring to those identified at being at risk from the defined threat. It is recognised that in deploying police the likelihood of subjects coming to harm may be increased.
36. Unsuitable tactical options, if implemented, could potentially increase risk. I have set out some of the relevant implications and considerations below.
37. As a tactical adviser, I must consider implications and considerations relating to the tactical options. Containment and call out would not have been a valid tactical option for an interception on Bracknell Close on 11th December 2015, nor would it have been a lower risk option, for the following reasons:
 - a. Planning time would be required to ensure that the Audi was effectively contained by armed officers. Before the vehicle settled in Bracknell Close, we did not know this was where any interception would take place.
 - b. The vehicle could move at any time and settle at a different location, as determined by the subjects and not by police.
 - c. Whilst it is recognised that a less dynamic response would provide more time for subjects to comply with police instructions, the tactic requires compliance of the subjects.

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