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Operation Ankaa is a proactive operation being conducted by the Central Task Force at Barking in response to reliable intelligence that there is an ongoing conspiracy to assist Izzet EREN in escaping from custody on Friday 11th December, when he is due to appear at Wood Green Crown Court.

On Tuesday 13th October Izzet EREN and Erwin Gyamfi were stopped by ARVs on a stolen motorbike travelling south from Haringey towards Hackney in Stamford Hill N16. They were in possession of two loaded weapons with the safety catches off, a Tokarov 9mm pistol containing six rounds of ammunition and a Scorpion machine pistol with a full magazine.

They were charged and first appeared at Wood Green Crown Court on Friday 1st November pleading guilty to offences including possession of firearms with intent to endanger life.

Given the overall circumstances of their arrest :

- Stolen motor bike
- Nature and ready condition of firearms
- Clothing (two sets and balaclavas)

Izzet EREN has been deported from the UK and has clearly

- returned with specific intent.
- Evidential history of shootings/murders involving the EREN family.

The prosecution were allowed a period of six weeks to consider their position whether an offence of Conspiracy To Murder should be added to the Indictment prior to sentence. No decision has yet been made by the CPS.

Izzet EREN and Erwin GYAMFI have remained on remand at HMP Wormwood Scrubs. They are next due at Wood Green Crown Court on Friday 11th December 2015.

On 1st November intelligence suggested that **Ozcan Eren had coordinated a team to assist Izzet Eren escape from custody on 29 October.**
The team had access to a stolen vehicle and weapons, including a firearm to do this, but the plan was aborted.

The operational team have since identified the aforementioned stolen vehicle, a black Audi A6, VRM KM13YPT, which has been parked since then in a private car park at Eastern Road, Wood Green. This is a short distance from Wood Green Court, and is located between the court building and the North Circular. This would appear the likely route taken by any prison van arriving in the morning from Wormwood Scrubs.

This vehicle is on false number plates, the original index being **DPA** which was stolen from a burglary on 28/08/2015. The vehicle is parked in a non-descript car park bordering an estate to which none of the subjects have any known connections. Technical control has now been obtained on this vehicle.

The EREN's represent the Tottenham side of the long running feud with the rival Hackney Turks which has seen numerous shootings and murders dating back to 2009 in both London and Turkey.(summary attached)

The following information is not to be disclosed without consultation with the author as it

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	Intent	It is not known whether Ozcan EREN will be a member of the team on the day or will be conducting operations from a distance
	Vulnerable Person	No issues identified
1.4.4	Identity	
	Capability	
	Intent	
	Vulnerable Person	

1.5	SFCS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT / TASKINGS	Tasked To
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SIO to develop identity of unknown subjects	DI Murray

2	THREAT & RISK				
2.1	Agreed level of risk with the TFC	What is the AGREED level of risk identified			Final Order
General Public Now	H	M	L	UK	1

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It is not envisaged that any such offence would be committed in the direct presence of members of the public and as such the threat to potential victims is currently low. There is no current intelligence to suggest that any member of the public will be targeted to facilitate this activity.

Serco / Custodians / prisoners

At this stage the operational team have control of the subject vehicle . It is intended that this will not reach the vicinity of the Prisoner Van and will be intercepted before the commission of any offence . If control of the subject s vehicle occurs and over and covert armed contingency is available to the TFC to maximise the security of both staff and prisoners.

H M L UK 2

Unarmed Police Officers

The threat to both armed and unarmed police during general surveillance phase is low. The threat is managed by the use of fully trained surveillance officers to conduct the operation who will use their trade craft to remain covert.

H M L UK 3

Armed Officers

The threat to both armed and unarmed police during general surveillance phase is low. The threat is managed by the use of fully trained surveillance officers to conduct the operation who will use their trade craft to remain covert.

H M L UK 4

Unknown Subjects

H M L UK 5

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OPTIONS

4.1

DESCRIPTION OF PLAN, TACTICS & CONTINGENCIES PROPOSED BY TFC

It is the intention of the operational team to conduct three surveillance operations.

1. On the Audi (Mast)
2. On the Serco Prison vehicle (Mast)
3. On Ozcan EREN if he is not with the Audi. (Unarmed)
4. Overt / covert security of Serco Prison Vehicle and court if control of subject(s) vehicle are not established

This is with a view to gather intelligence / evidence in relation to the planned offence as outlined or other opportunities to arrest and disrupt the escape plan

The TFC has also considered other options, such as 'do nothing', 'arrest now', take 'mitigating action', 'wait for further intelligence', 'conduct unarmed surveillance' and 'conducting static OP's'. However, in the circumstances as outlined in this application and on applying the NDM these options do not meet the threat assessment or the operational aims. The proposed tactics meet the threat assessment, the working strategy, and are proportionate given the threats posed. All actions are legal as documented in this document.

These options will provide me with the flexibility necessary for this type of operation. It is proportionate to the threat faced and follows best practice. SC&O7, SC&O35 and SC&O19 work regularly together and is my recommendation for this operation.

This rationale is completed after consideration of the following factors: -

1. The current intelligence and information about the operation and subjects,
2. The strategic intention, operation policing objectives and threat assessment.
3. The resources available at this time
4. Guidance contained in the Authorised Professional Practice Armed Policing Module
5. MPS Policy.

No intervention is to take place within premises unless to prevent immediate loss to life or serious harm to any individual.

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I have discussed this operation with the TFC: **FE16** this deployment is necessary and proportionate. SCO 19 will be armed for the purpose of intervention/interception against an unidentified threat during the transportation of a serving prisoner. **SCO 35** will be armed for the purpose of self protection whilst conducting surveillance. I am satisfied that there is insufficient evidence to arrest and charge the un identified subjects to date for any offences. I am also satisfied that disrupting the offence at this time will not fulfil the strategy.

The proposed plan provides the flexibility necessary for this type of operation. It is proportionate to the threat and follows best practice.

SCO 19 officers will be armed in a MAST configuration supporting the SERCO van and surveillance officers. SCO 35 officers will be armed for their own/public protection. SCO19 will be armed for the purpose of intervention / interception of any unidentified threat. Armed overt resources will be used to minimise any threat to the court or during the transportation process if control of the subjects can not be maintained. Officers are authorised for the carrying and usage of tyre deflation rounds and distraction devices for the purpose of intervention / interception.

I have reviewed the threat assessment, tactical advice and working strategy in line with the National Decision Model. **Having applied the National Decision Model. I authorise firearms to be deployed on this operation on Friday 11th December 2015.**

I have reviewed the tactical advice, I am satisfied that the tactical plan is capable of meeting the strategic aims of the operation. The tactical plan is in my view a lawful, proportionate and measured response to the threat and risk that has been identified and documented within this and related FA forms. Both the tactical and strategic plans are ECHR compliant.

Plan

DCI FE16 has completed the FA2 and will act as the TFC for the deployment on **11th December 2015**. I will be available to **DCI FE16** all day on the **11th December 2015** and will be kept abreast of developments through C3000. All armed officers will be reminded by the Tactical Firearms Commander **DCI FE16** prior to the deployment of their responsibilities and powers under Section 3 CLA 1967, Section 117 PACE 1984, common law and the HRA 1998. They will also be reminded of the guidelines relating to the deployment, carriage and use of firearms and force. I have considered the deployment of less lethal options that will be available to the firearms team. The briefing will be recorded.

As Strategic Firearms Commander (SFC) I will remain responsible for the resources deployed on the operation and will ensure they are adequate to fulfil the strategy. All staff deployed must receive the intelligence briefing and be aware of their individual responsibilities and risks. The TFC is responsible for H & S briefing and to ensure all officers deployed have current OST mandatory training and the correct equipment available to them.

As SFC I will ensure that an efficient communications structure is in place and that any changes in strategy are relayed to the officers deployed. All tactical responsibilities remain with the TFC (within tactical parameters) and I remind them of their responsibilities to seek Tactical Advice where appropriate throughout the operation from a trained TAC advisor.

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I have considered the suitability of DCI **FE16** to act as Tactical Firearms Commander in this operation and I am satisfied that he is not the SIO.

I am also satisfied with the Command and control function of C3000 which will be a central point for all intelligence and communication to the two ground assigned TFC's

Description

SCO19 and SCO 35 will be armed for the purpose of intervention / interception to support this investigation

Unarmed SC&O7 officers to offer operational support in event of the subjects arrest and utilisation in the event of contingencies.

C3000

TFC WITH MAST 1

TFC WITH MAST 2

Location of TFC During Operation

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